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Peacetime atomic energy is truly a twentieth-century frontier. It has all the
promise, the excitement, and the unexpectedness of the frontiers that spurred the
imagination in eras past. Among the many uses of the peaceful atom, the generation
of electric power from nuclear fission (and perhaps fusion) is probably the most
far-reaching and significant. It may well have an utterly fundamental impact on
the economic and social well-being of the peoples of the world. In the words of
President Eisenhower, "... the atom stands ready to become man's obedient, tireless
servant, if man will only allow it."'
At the beginning, more than a decade ago, America jumped into the lead in
atomic energy development. Nuclear energy leveled two cities in 1945; since then,
its destructive power has been vastly refined and often demonstrated, but never
unleashed against human beings as it was at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The achieve-
ment of the A-bomb required an incredible expenditure in men and resources and
a necessarily exclusive concentration on destruction. At the war's end, peacetime
nuclear power generation was little more than an intriguing possibility in the minds
of a few scientists, who had been able to give it only limited attention during the big
wartime effort. In the decade that has passed since World War II, however, the
peacetime atom has slowly gathered the momentum that now promises to carry it
on to provide almost unimaginable benefits for the entire world.
In this country, the influence of the United States Atomic Energy Commission,
until recently, has blanketed the whole realm of atomic energy. It was a necessary
decision in 1946 that kept atomic energy under the complete control of the federal
government, where it had developed. The atom remained a governmental monopoly,
and the ARC, directly responsible for its development and use, has been the over-
whelmingly dominant locus of power in this field, together with the unusually in-
fluential Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
Today there is a trend away from this unique domination by the federal govern-
ment in the civilian phases of atomic energy. There is under way a program to cre-
ate a true private atomic power industry under policies agreed upon by all branches
of the Government and written into the new Atomic Energy Act of I954.2 This
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has had a substantial impact on the role of the Commission, for so long the ex-
clusive steward of the atom. Government monopoly is giving way to ever more
private participation in nuclear power. The Commission is performing new func-
tions and facing new problems as it moves from its old operating role into the period
of transition, marked by government-industry cooperative ventures, that will precede
the advent of a private atomic power industry.
Tim EARLY REAcTOR PROGRAM
The early exclusive role of the AEC in atomic power development was carried
out under the provisions of the original Atomic Energy Act of I946. The AEC
was an operating agency in charge of a federally owned enterprise. According to the
act, only the Government could own both fissionable materials and utilization facili-
ties-reactors and weapons.' Work in atomic energy, therefore, had to be a pro-
gram of the Government. This is not to say that other groups and individuals-
especially scientists and industrial contractors hired by the AEC--had no influence
on the program. It simply meant that the Commission was the only means of
access to atomic energy. If there was to be atomic power development, it would
have to be done through the AEC.
What, in fact, did the AEC do about atomic power? The possibility of pro-
ducing power through nuclear fission was seen before the close of World War II.
From the Manhattan Engineer District, the AEC inherited a rather rudimentary
program of research aimed at solving the fundamental technological problems stand-
ing in the way of workable atomic power plants.5 Dr. Farrington Daniels, of the
University of Wisconsin, had made preliminary studies of power "piles," beginning
in 1944 at Oak Ridge, and he had demonstrated their theoretical feasibility. Investi-
gations of anticipated problems were carried on subsequently, and in 1946, this re-
search program was divided between the Clinton Laboratories, at Oak Ridge, and
the Argonne National Laboratory, near Chicago.
The MED had also awarded two prime contracts for power development. One,
to Monsanto Chemical Company, was for development at Oak Ridge of a reactor
based on the Daniels findings and on later research. The other contract, to General
Electric, provided for research and development work on several different designs.
The government-owned Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, near Schenectady, New
York, was established in November 1946 to facilitate this program.
Here, then, was a small but going program which the AEC took over from the
MED. But even the feasibility of nuclear power was not yet assured. The range
of difficult problems to be solved was enormous, and the effort required was a long,
difficult, and costly one. Cheap nuclear power seemed hardly on the horizon in
X946.
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The AEC, when it took over the project, faced the problem which faces any
agency: to balance the benefits to be derived from one program against those
of other programs upon which the same money and effort might be expended. This
question of priorities faced the Commission at once, and the answer was a foregone
conclusion. Atomic power in the United States was not immediately necessary,
since other sources offered plentiful power for the time being. Broad and energetic
weapons and production programs, however, seemed extremely urgent, to say the
least. The incoming Commissioners found that these programs were far weaker than
had been expected, and the weapons and materials stockpile was surprisingly small.
Scientific and technical personnel were leaving the project at the conclusion of the
war, just when they were needed to push ahead with weapons development and to
solve certain technical difficulties that had arisen-such as those threatening to shut
down the plutonium-producing reactors at Hanford.!
To concentrate on these primary jobs, the AEC put atomic power development at
a low priority. Some attention was given, it is true, to other peacetime uses, such as
radioactive isotopes. But isotopes could be easily and quickly produced in the already-
existing experimental "piles," and the usefulness to medicine and industry of cheaply
produced isotopes was great. Atomic power, on the other hand, was speculative, un-
certain, and obviously expensive and difficult. There seemed to be no justification
for undertaking such a major effort at that time.
For these reasons, reactor development under the AEC was, for almost two years,
a relatively minor program. The Commission, in carrying on the small IED pro-
gram, did achieve some measure of progress. Some of the results were disappoint-
ing, however: Oak Ridge completed its studies of a gas-cooled reactor in late 1947,
but the AEC, on the basis of these studies, decided not to proceed with what had
turned out to be an unpromising design 7
The desire of the armed forces for military propulsion power reactors, however,
did much to invigorate the Commission's reactor development program. The pro-
gram, of course, was in such early stages that one could not easily divide it into
military and civilian phases. Many technical problems had to be solved which ap-
plied to power reactors generally, regardless of their ultimate use. But there was
military interest from early days, watching for developments that could be of use in
warfare.
Particular impetus came from the Navy. Even before 1947, naval circles were
planning to make eventual use of power reactors for aircraft and ship or submarine
propulsion 8 After some earlier consideration, the Navy commenced studies of
a reactor and began to acquire data on the problems connected with it. In 1947,
to get further data on heat transfer, the Navy negotiated a large research con-
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tract with General Electric, and the AEC agreed to spend a smaller sum on naval
reactor studies. After completing studies of the gas-cooled reactor, Oak Ridge began
investigating a water-cooled reactor for a submarine at the Navy's suggestion.
During December 1947, the whole atomic power program was reviewed by the
Navy, and specific recommendations were made to the Secretary of the Navy for
working with the AEC on a submarine propulsion plant. The Secretary approved
the plan, and proposals for a joint AEC-Navy program were forwarded to the
Commission. Following a General Advisory Committee recommendation in favor
of such a program, the AEC proceeded with planning. In late 1948, the Commission
engaged Westinghouse to construct an experimental propulsion reactor in coopera-
tion with the Argonne Laboratory.
When the AEC came into being, there was also a program for study of nuclear
energy for the propulsion of aircraft, the NEPA project.9 This study program,
which was under neither the MED nor the AEC, was a combined operation of ten
aviation companies and the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, working
with the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation, prime contractor under the
Army Air Forces. The project received assistance from the AEC at Oak Ridge, and
later carried out certain materials tests at the Commission's Idaho reactor testing
station.
The year 1949 saw a considerable firming up of the reactor development program,
in part due to this military interest. The Commission formalized its several projects
into a combined military-civilian program. Its first step was the creation, in late
1948, of a new Reactor Development Division, partly on the recommendations of
the Industrial Advisory Committee."0 Early in 1949, the Commission activated the
division by the appointment of Dr. Lawrence R. Hafstad as its director.1 Soon
afterward came the announcement of a new attack on the problems of reactor
development, built around four types of military and civilian reactors: the navy
thermal reactor for submarine propulsion, a fast breeder reactor, an intermediate
breeder reactor, and a materials-testing reactor1 2  Commissioner Bacher, who re-
vealed the new program, said also that attention was being given to other possible
reactors, including aircraft propulsion plants and natural uranium and homogeneous
power reactors.
However, the civilian power reactors were not projected primarily to develop
power, but to develop the breeding process. This was felt to be important as a possible
means of increasing the supply of fissionable materials for military uses. But even
the breeder program was too long-range and speculative to withstand the intensifica-
tion of the international atomic arms race following the first Soviet atomic explosion
9 See id. at 178-79.
" See Atomic Energy Commission Names Carleton Shugg Deputy General Manager, Realines Duties
of Headquarters Staff Divisions, AEC Release No. 122, Aug. 5, 1948.13 See United States AEC Names Dr. Lawrence R. Hafstad Director of Reactor Development Division,
AEC Release No. x52, Jan. 16, 1949.1 See Atomic Power and Private Enterprise, supra note 5, at 252-54.
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in September 1949. This event led to even more stress on the military side of re-
actor development and some slackening of work on the program for breeder power
plants. Thus, in April i95o, the intermediate power breeder being developed by the
General Electric Company at Knolls was cancelled. And, faced with a manpower
shortage occasioned by the expansion in production at Hanford, which it operated,
and the speed-up required on the military projects, General Electric was further com-
pelled to curtail plans it had begun for a closely related intermediate reactor for
naval propulsion.'3
Thus, while the military uses of nuclear power invigorated reactor development,
they also held activity away from civilian power projects. Later years saw continued
emphasis on atomic military strength, both in expanded production and weapons
programs and in the military reactor program. The latter, however, helped in
solving technological problems of peacetime power reactors. This was particularly
true of the submarine thermal reactor, a pressurized water type, which was closely
related to the needs of civilian central-station power plants. The close relationship is
shown by the fact that the first large-scale AEC power plant and two of the first
industrial proposals are of this general type, as will be seen later.
Throughout the entire period of the early reactor program, the Commission made
and executed atomic power policy behind the same barricade of secrecy that hid
its weapons programs from the eyes of potential enemies. A few outside groups, it
is true, did have access to the restricted realm of the atom, and these had an in-
fluence on the program. At first, the General Advisory Committee was extremely
important in almost all phases of the AEC's activity. Beginning in 1949, under
the energetic leadership of Senator Brien McMahon, the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy began to come into its own as a close participant in atomic policy formula-
tion. The Industrial Advisory Committee had access through 1948 to the Commis-
sion's programs and made a number of helpful suggestions for improvement. And,
of course, the AEC's few contractors had knowledge of the programs and a certain
amount of influence. Even taken together, however, these groups made up an ex-
tremely small control group. It was still true that the Commission pursued its pro-
grams in relative isolation, and there was little outside control, participation, or crit-
icism.
In i95I, however, the AEC began a trend in atomic power development toward
ever greater knowledge and assumption of responsibility by private industry. Its
new program of industrial participation marked the beginning of the end of the
Commission's comparatively exclusive role in atomic power development.
INDUsTRIAL STUDY GRouPs
It was the needs of the military, so prominent in the early years, that gave rise
to the Commission's industrial participation program, begun in x951. This program
grew out of a proposal by Dr. Charles A. Thomas, President of Monsanto Chemical
" See id. at 276.
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Company. Dr. Thomas wrote to the AEC on June 20, i95o, and suggested a plan
whereby "... American industry would design, construct, and operate one or more
atomic power plants with its own capital."' 4 According to the plan, the Govern-
ment would own all fissionable materials. The plants were to be dual-purpose, pro-
ducing plutonium as well as power. All plutonium would belong to the Govern-
ment, which was to pay a fee for the production of this fissionable material. Such
a fee would offset the high power costs and make the venture profitable for industry,
it was felt. On the other hand, the Government would get plutonium at costs
lower than those at Hanford, and the national security would be enhanced by in-
creased and more widely dispersed plutonium production facilities.
In later discussions, Dr. Thomas suggested that this plan required three stages: a
study of the AEC reactor program, development and design work, and construction
and operation of the reactor.' 5 In December i95o, Detroit Edison and Dow Chem-
ical proposed an economic design survey of possible power reactors, which also re-
quired access to the AEC's information and know-how as a first stage.0 6
These two proposals favorably impressed the Commission. Early in i95i, the
AEC announced its willingness to move ahead with the first step in each proposal:
a study of the AEC reactor development program by properly qualified and cleared
groups from the industrial concerns involved.17 In May 1951, the Commission re-
vealed that negotiations were nearly completed with four groups from industry for
the commencement of these study programs.' In addition to the two original
groups-Monsanto Chemical-Union Electric and Detroit Edison-Dow Chemical-
two new groups entered the program: Commonwealth Edison-Public Service of
Northern Illinois, and Pacific Gas and Electric-Bechtel. The AEC felt that no fur-
ther proposals could be considered at the time because of the demands these studies
would make on AEC technical personnel.
By April 1952, interim reports from all four study groups had been submitted
to the Commission. The groups manifested a ". . . cautious optimism that the
difficult technical and cost factors involved will be solved eventually."'19 The Dow-
Detroit Edison group was the first to submit a proposal for going on to the next
stage, which included additional research and development work by both the com-
panies and the AEC. Others followed, and a second round of studies finally ma-
terialized. Five groups of companies participated-the original four and Foster
Wheeler-Pioneer Service-Diamond Alkali.
In late 1953, the program underwent rapid expansion2 ° By the spring of 1955,
"' See id. at 279.
' See id. at 297-98.
' See id. at 296-97.
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nineteen groups had participated, and eighteen were actively engaged under then-
current study agreements. Some seventy-one companies made up the study groups.
By 1955, several had progressed beyond the initial familiarization stage to undertake
plant design and component developmental projects, such as fuel-element tests and
heat-exchanger work.21
The early industrial participation program was important, not because it resulted
itself in any marked alteration in the AEC's role in nuclear power development, but
because it laid the groundwork for a new commission role in the period to follow.
First, it advanced the technology to a substantial degree. By mid-i954, the AEC
reported, the members of the study groups had spent almost five million dollars
of their own money on developmental projects. 2 Second, it gave a number of
industrial firms and public-power groups knowledge about nuclear power, without
which their participation in future stages of development was naturally impossible.
As a result of the study programs, according to the Commission, ". . . probably half
of the [nineteen] groups have acquired sufficient know-how to be potential builders
or operators of nuclear power plants."2" In 1955, eight participants were able to bid
on the army package-power reactor. And three members of the group, it was an-
nounced, had reached the point where they could undertake design and development
programs as a start toward assuming the responsibility for technological advance that
had previously been solely the Government's 2
EVOLUTION OF POLICY FOR THE "INDUCTION" PHASE
The first round of studies under the industrial participation program brought
forth varying recommendations from the participants, but all were optimistic about
the possibility of developing low-cost nuclear power. Meanwhile, the AEC itself
had taken a step forward; at the end of I951, it succeeded in producing small
amounts of power from its experimental breeder reactor at the Idaho reactor testing
station.2
The possibilities for future competitive nuclear power generation, then, seemed
bright in 1952. It remained to attack the unsolved materials, design, and engineering
problems. This meant partly that the research and testing of the past would have
to be continued. It also meant that, before long, there would have to be construction
of actual nuclear power plants, uneconomical though they would be. Only in this
way, it was felt, could the final stages of development be carried out, to achieve
power so cheap that it would compete with power generated by conventional fuels.
Thus, by 1952, atomic power was moving from the earliest stage of basic research
and feasibility studies into the second stage of active developmental work, including
2 1 Ibid.
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actual construction and subsequent refinement of the first full-scale "model-T" power
plants.
The need for construction of actual power plants became more and more ap-
parent as laboratory and small pilot-plant research and development began to reach
the limit of its usefulness in advancing toward competitive nuclear power. Dr.
Lawrence R. Hafstad, head of the AEC's Reactor Development Division, told the
Joint Committee in mid-i953 that a stage of technology had been reached at which
a number of different designs looked good.26 It was impossible to tell which par-
ticular design would be the "winner" merely by making paper studies and analyses,
however. Thus, a number of the best designs had to be built and operated, Dr.
Hafstad said, in order to continue progressing toward cheap nuclear power. Chair-
man Dean elaborated on this by describing the four or five years after 1953 as a
development period, which would be characterized by the building of reactor proto-
types or experimental reactors2 These would be neither large enough nor suffi-
ciently refined technically to produce economical power, atlhough they would pro-
duce rather substantial amounts of high-cost power, as compared with the previous
experimental reactors. It is this developmental period that is referred to as the "in-
duction" phase.
This period posed new issues for the AEC. Early research was, naturally, a com-
mission monopoly. Early industrial study agreements had been able, in most cases,
to do little more than provide access to industrial firms to observe the AEC's achieve-
ments in this field and to consider the possibility and direction of future efforts. By
1952, however, a number of industrial firms had developed sufficient know-how to be-
come active in the later stages of development. How much of a role was private in-
dustry to have in this later work? Who was to build the experimental plants neces-
sary to make nuclear power competitive?
The history of the Commission prior to this time indicates a basic philosophy,
often stated, of allowing as much opportunity as possible for private groups-pri-
marily business organizations and universities-to participate in the operation of
the atomic energy project. The Commission of 1951 and i952 continued to assert
that private organizations must play a maximum role. In a speech delivered on
November 29, i95I, Commissioner Glennan expressed concern over ". . . the
overlong continuation of the present governmentally dominated industrial-govern-
mental relationship for the prosecution of the atomic program ... ."'I He indicated
to his audience of engineers some of the ways in which the AEC had attempted to
enlarge the amount of industrial participation and urged them to be alert and
aggressive in assuming a share of responsibility for atomic development.
At this same time, there were growing signs that industry was eager to assume this
" See Hearings before the joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Atomic Power Development and
Private Enterprise, 83 d Cong., ist Sess. 22-23 (953).
'7 See id. at 24.2 See Atomic Power and Private Enterprise, supra note 5, at 316.
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share of responsibility. During 1952, some eight different plans for building the first
large noncompetitive plants were put forth by various groups inside and outside
Government.2 9 These proposals included several different patterns of government
and private participation. Some persons thought the AEC should build new pro-
duction reactors (or adapt those then under construction) to produce power as well
as plutonium. By this route, the Government would bear the financial burden of
developing reactor technology. This "all-Government" approach contrasted with
other suggestions, including those of Detroit Edison, whose president, Walker L.
Cisler, suggested that cooperative government-industry research should continue to
iron out the problems for a time; then, subject to appropriate revisions in the law,
private industry would itself finance and build a full-scale power-plutonium reactor.
Several additional proposals contained still other possible arrangements for achieving
the early stages of construction and operation.
Late in 1952, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy determined that the time
had come to make whatever basic decisions were required, including amendment
of the act, if necessary, to dispel the uncertainty surrounding nuclear power and to
get forward with the actual work. Therefore, the Joint Committee requested a
policy statement from the AEC and scheduled hearings on atomic power develop-
ment for the spring of i953.s
The AEC policy statement received National Security Council approval before it
was forwarded to the Joint Committee. It began with these basic points:
i) Development of economically competitive nuclear power is increasingly im-
portant both to the national economy and to the maintenance of American world
leadership, and it must be carried out with all possible speed.
2) The Commission must continue an active program of research and develop-
ment, but outside participation by qualified and interested groups is necessary to
achieve maximum progress.
3) Reasonable incentives are necessary to encourage such outside participation.
The Commission recommended several specific changes in the law which it felt
would provide for the necessary incentives31
As to the first point, foreign policy and international considerations had made
it urgent to get forward as fast as possible in atomic power development. In May
1953, the National Security Council had determined that early development of
cheap nuclear power was necessary to maintain our lead in atomic energy, and the
Commission came to feel a compelling responsibility to achieve this important na-
tional objective. Achievements in atomic power abroad made it seem vitally im-
portant that the United States not be outdone in this field by other nations. Hence,
the need for taking the shortest possible route with all dispatch.
To reach this important goal, the Commission contemplated a government pro-
2 See id?. at 19-26.
'0 See it. at iii-iv.
" See Hearings, supra note 26, at 6-7.
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gram combined with increased private participation, stimulated both by revisions in
the act (to give industry greater freedom) and by positive assistance from the AEC.
In its statement, the Commission specifically ruled out, however, one of the incentives
which had been extremely prominent in prior discussions. It was the objective of
its policy, the AEC said, to further the development of nuclear plants which would
be economically independent of government commitments to purchase weapons-grade
plutonium. 2 Early consideration of industrial participation, it will be recalled, was
mostly based on the dual-purpose idea, that private nuclear plants could be financed
only by aid of a long-term AEC commitment to buy fissionable materials produced.
As the Government's production program increased, the question arose whether the
stockpile might not reach a point at which no more weapons were needed. It was
seen to be difficult to assure a permanent market for these materials. Emphasis on
materials production seemed likely to slow the advance toward power which was
economically practical apart from subsidy through the purchase of materials.
In spite of its desire for eventual increased industrial participation, the AEC was
convinced that it would have to do the early prototype building itself. At the hear-
ings, Chairman Dean spoke as if several of the promising types of reactors would
have to be pushed to the rather large prototype stage by the Government before
private industry took over, and almost everyone agreed that at least one large in-
dustrial reactor would have to be government-built? 3
The 1953 policy remained essentially unchanged during the next two years, while
the new program for the transitional or "induction" stage crystallized. In 1954, the
Commission restated its philosophy in basically the same terms?4 In early 1955, the
AEC philosophy had changed little, but the Commission assumed there would be
more immediate assumption of industrial responsibility? 5 The program included
advanced government research, plus industrial construction and operation (mainly
without government assistance) of a number of early large-scale demonstration power
plants.
This AEC philosophy is now being put into practice in a program which does,
in fact, combine governmental research with the construction of large demonstra-
tion reactors, mostly financed by private industry. The year 1955 marked the be-
ginning of the "induction" phase, wherein cooperative government-business activity
is moving to build the first full-scale nuclear power plants, the necessary final step
to a genuine atomic power industry.
Under the provisions of the new Atomic Energy Act, the Commission is assuming
new roles as this phase of nuclear power development proceeds. From the preced-
ing period, the AEC has continued its operating program. As the principal aspect
"See id. at 7.
"See id. at 24-25.
8' See Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Report of the Subcommittee on Research and Development
on the Five-Year Power Reactor Development Program, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-9 (1954).
" See joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Current Statement of the Atomic Energy Commission
on the Five-Year Reactor Development Program, 84th Cong., ISt Sess. 2-5 (1955).
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of its activities at present, it is taking on a new role of aid and promotion, to achieve
the agreed-upon policy of maximum private participation, including private owner-
ship and operation of power reactors. In order that such scope may be given to
industrial activity, the Commission must assume a third role, that of regulator of
private operations in the interests of health and safety and the defense and security
of the nation. This new regulatory role will loom larger as the atomic power
industry becomes more firmly established and the other two roles diminish.
THE COMMISSION AS OPERATOR
Continuation of the Commission's own major research program did not require
amendment of the act. At the close of the 1953 hearings, upon the request of Chair-
man Cole of the Joint Committee, the AEC began working out a governmental re-
actor program which contained those features which seemed most likely to advance
the art toward competitive nuclear power and most appropriate for the Government,
rather than private industry, to carry out. The result was the Commission's present
Five-Year Reactor Development Program. 6
The first element in the five-year program, the construction of a large-scale, pres-
surized water power plant for civilian use, was announced in October I953.87 Com-
missioner Murray, who first revealed this initial project, said the new central-station
power plant would produce a minimum of 6oooo kilowatts of electricity.
Building the PWR, as this pressurized water reactor was called, was in keeping
with the role the Commission felt it was necessary to play: construction mainly by
government funds of at least one large prototype. It must be said, however, that the
decision was precipitated by causes other than the advancing technology of the
PWR. Another element in the picture was the world situation in 1953. It has been
noted that the new Eisenhower administration was beginning to see peacetime
atomic energy as an important pawn in world politics and the cold war. The Joint
Committee and the AEC also held this view. The announcement, in October 1953,
of Russian success in achieving a thermonuclear explosion intensified the feeling that
atomic power policy was vitally important. Speaking for the AEC, Commissioner
Murray said that an equally noteworthy achievement by the Russians in peacetime
applications would be an even greater blow to the position and prestige of the
United States among the world's nations than their success with the H-bomb. Mr.
Murray expressed a strong conviction that maintenance of our leadership in the
peaceful aspects of atomic energy is a goal of vital national importance.38
This combination of technical and policy considerations resulted in a decision that
the time was at hand for prototype construction to begin. It was permitted by a
provision in the fiscal year 1954 budget, inserted partly on the advice of the Joint
Committee, which was pushing the Commission to take this step. Advancing tech-
nology had led the Commission to request funds to begin construction of experi-
36 Ibid.
" See N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1953, P. 14, col. 3.
38 ibid.
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mental reactors in its original fiscal year 1954 budget, the so-called "Truman budget,"
prepared by the outgoing administration. When the "Eisenhower budget" was
prepared, however, the construction funds disappeared. Partly upon the urging of
Chairman Cole of the Joint Committee, the House Appropriations Committee in-
serted language in the money bill recommending that not to exceed seven million
dollars be spent to begin such construction. The need for international leadership in
nuclear power resulted in the decision to build immediately a large-scale facility with
this authorization, and it was on this understanding that the House Subcommittee
voted the provision39
In February 1954, the AEC revealed the remaining elements of its new five-year
reactor development program ° This program was based on five approaches-out
of "perhaps 8o or more"--to the problem of attaining competitive power. One
was the large-scale PWR. The others were to be four small experimental reactors
employing as many different principles of design: a boiling water reactor, a sodium-
graphite reactor, a fast breeder reactor, and a homogeneous reactor.
Although this five-year development program was a government program, the
Government alone, it was felt, could not bring to bear the same drive toward
achieving maximum efficiency and lowest cost. Before going ahead on the PWR,
Commissioner Murray said, the AEC had asked again the fundamental question:
Would private industry, if permitted by law, do this job itself? By the close of the
1953 hearings, however, it had become clear that it was just "not in the cards" for
industry to invest the necessary large sums of capital. The AEC did, however, at-
tempt to give private industry the maximum possible role, particularly on the PWR.
Commissioner Murray invited offers from industry to invest risk capital in the build-
ing of the steam and turbine portions of the plant, as well as in the operation of the
entire installation.41 This proposal created widespread interest in industry. Nine offers
came from as many firms to share in the project. Of these, the one submitted by
the Duquesne Light Company of Pittsburgh seemed most favorable to the Govern-
ment, and was accepted in March I954. Duquesne offered to furnish a site for
the project (at Shippingport, Pennsylvania), to build and operate the generating
plant, to operate the reactor part of the plant, to assume five milion dollars of the
cost of research and construction, and to pay the Commission at a specified rate for
the steam produced. AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss estimated at the time that this
arrangement will reduce the Government's expenditures by thirty million dollars
during the period of construction and the first five years of operation.
In the case of the sodium-graphite project, the AEC followed the precedent
established with the PWR. The North American Aviation Company, which had
" See Statement of Sterling Cole, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Release, Oct. 22, 1953. See also
Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations on Independent Offces
Appropriations for Z955, 83 d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 2575 (i954).
"0 See Report, supra note 34, at 6-14.
'* See N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1953, p. 14, col. 3.
"See AEC and Duquesne Light Co. to Negotiate on Atomic Power Plant, AEC Release No. 526,
March 14, 1954.
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worked on the sodium-graphite principle for some time, contracted to participate
with the Government in joint development of the reactor3 North American agreed
to assume two and a half million of the ten million dollar project costs and to
furnish a reactor site.
THE COMMISSION AS PROMOTER
A. The Statutory Framework
Without amendment of the act, the AEC could hardly have achieved its second
goal: primary industrial initiative in constructing additional large-scale demonstra-
tion reactors. Such amendment became a reality in August 1954, with the passage
of a new Atomic Energy Act.
This greatly revised basic statute offered incentives to increased participation by
industry in several ways. Most important, it permitted private ownership of re-
actors and private use of fissionable material (now called special nuclear material)
under a system of licensing and continuing regulation.44 It allowed patenting of
inventions previously prohibited.45 It authorized greater freedom in making avail-
able classified technical information to industry4 Finally, as will be seen, it per-
mitted the Commission to offer additional incentive to private participation by
granting various types of assistance during the developmental period.
The AEC did not, however, receive much guidance from the act on how to carry
out this promotional role; consequently, it has a wide range of discretion. The first
question is whether the AEC should offer assistance at all. Subsidy will probably
not be a permanent feature in this area, because nuclear power is potentially cheaper
than power from ordinary fuel sources. Government aid will not, then, be an in-
definite support of a higher level of service than would otherwise occur. Once nuclear
power is competitive, if not sooner, industry may be expected to invade the field
with enthusiasm. How long aid will be necessary-and whether it will be necessary
at all-is for the AEC to decide.
If the Commission decides promotion is necessary, it must resolve the issue of
how to carry out this promotion. Several possible routes are provided in the act.
First, the AEC can offer assistance through its discretion in pricing. Since the
Government owns all special nuclear material, it was decided that compensation
should be given to private reactor owners who produce such material in their facili-
ties. Whoever lawfully produces special nuclear material "shall be paid a fair
price. 147  The act specifies the considerations which are to enter into the Commis-
sion's determination of a "fair" price. The Commission, says the act,48
" See AEC and North American Aviation Will Share Cost of Sodium-Graphite Reactor Experiment,
AEC Release No. 550, July 13, 1954.
" §§4x, 53, 68 STAT. 928, 930, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2o6i, 2073 (Supp. 1954); cf. note 4 stupra.
'"§12, 68 STAT. 944, 42 U.S.C.A. §2182 (Supp. 1954); cf. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, §Six, 6o
STAT. 768, 42 U.S.C. §18xr (1946).
" H142, 143, 68 STAT. 941, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2162, 2163 (Supp. 1954); cf. Atomic Energy Act of
1946, §io, 6o STAT. 766, 42 U.S.C. §18io (1946).
"§52, 68 STAT. 929, 42 U.S.C.A. §2072 (Supp. 1954).
'" §56, 68 STAT. 931, 42 U.S.C.A. §2076 (Supp. 1954).
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. .. shall take into consideration the value of the special nuclear material for its intended
use by the United States and may give such weight to the actual cost of producing that
material as the Commission finds to be equitable.
As the Joint Committee report explained, this means that the price is to be based
"primarily" on the value to the Government of the intended use, and "only sec-
ondarily" on the actual production cost 9
This leaves a great deal within the discretion of the Commission. How does one
determine the value of an atomic weapon, if it is decided that privately produced
materials should be put to this use? Even if the question of value can be solved,
do the words "primarily" and "secondarily" have any concrete meaning as used in
the Committee report? The act itself is even more vague, stating only that the
AEC shall "take into consideration" the one factor, and give such weight to the
other as it deems to be "equitable." Even with the committee report, the Commis-
sion is hardly given any very specific guidance in setting these prices. Since the
price schedules announced early in 1955 remain classified at the time of this writing,
it is impossble to observe the manner in which the AEC worked them out.
The Commission also has wide discretion in setting prices for the use of special
nuclear material and source material and for other materials and industrial services
supplied by the Government. Special nuclear material and source materials may
be distributed for use in research and development either without a charge or at
a "reasonable charge."5  The Commission must determine, in writing, criteria
to judge whether or not a charge should be made. With special nuclear material,
if a reasonable charge is found to be in order, the AEC still has room to set the
prices at various levels. One factor to be considered is the cost of material
to the AEC, but the use to be made of the material may also be considered,
the extent to which that use will "advance the development of the peaceful uses of
atomic energy," and the energy value of the material in the use to which it will be
put. This allows wide individual adjustments. With source material, there is less
opportunity for individual variation, but the AEC still is free to furnish the ma-
terial without any charge at all, for private research and development.
As to other materials (e.g., heavy water) and industrial services (e.g., fuel-element
fabrication and chemical processing), the Commission must set nondiscriminatory
prices which provide "reasonable" compensation for the Government and which do
not discourage the development of independent sources of supply."' However,
under the provision of section 31,52 permitting the AEC to make research and de-
velopment contracts and other arrangements, it seems likely that the Commission
can provide materials and services without any charge at all, although this problem
"
9 See H. R. REP. No. 2181, JoINT CoMMirTEE oN AroMIc ENERGY, Report to Accompany H.R.
9757, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 83 d Cong., 2d Sess. x6 (i954).
80 §§53(c), (d) and 63(c), 68 STAT. 930, 933, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2073(c), (d), and 2093(c) (Supp.
1954).
"1 §x61 (m), 68 STAT. 950, 42 U.S.C.A. §22oi (m) (Supp. 1954).
"268 STAT. 927, 42 U.S.C.A. §205, (Supp. 1954).
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of statutory interpretation has not yet been setded. In any case, the requirement of
"reasonable" compensation for the Government is not a strict one and gives the AEC
discretion to set prices which substantially aid the private firms involved.
In regard to "burn-up" or loss of special nuclear materials, the AEC is of the
opinion that it has discretion under the act to decide whether to charge or not in
connection with research and development projects. Section 53 (d) (5) requires a
charge under commercial licenses, but says nothing about section 104 licenses.5 3 This
the Commission interpreted to mean that "we are not required under section 104
to charge for burn-up, but we are not prohibited from doing so.""
Representatives Holifield and Price of the Joint Committee have pointed out
and deplored the additional subsidy possibilities provided by these pricing pro-
visions, over and above the built-in subsidy afforded by retaining government owner-
ship of special nuclear materials and requiring that private producers be compen-
sated.55 Regarding the AEC's power to make a "reasonable charge" for use of ma-
terials and to pay a "fair price" for materials produced, they have stated: o
But the vague generalities set up in lieu of standards to guide the Commission in
determining both these critical figures leaves a degree of discretion in the administrative
body that would enable it to pay considerably more for the production than it charged for
the original supply of special nuclear material, thus affording private utilities, let us say,
subsidies of undetermined magnitude for their participation in the development of nuclear
power. Such subsidies resulting from dual transactions might well escape the public
eye.
Second, the AEC can assist private endeavor in nuclear power research and de-
velopment by "arrangements (including contracts, agreements, and loans) for the
conduct of research and development activities relating to" a number of specified
areas of atomic theory, production, and utilization. The language of section 169
appears to permit this form of aid in connection with private nuclear power plants
under noncommercial section io4 licenses.58 As will be seen, this interpretation of
the statutory language gave rise to a dispute, the outcome of which is not yet entirely
clear.
B. A Concrete Program for Increased Industrial Participation
With a framework for augmented industrial participation established by the
new statute, the Commission moved to take advantage of its potentialities. In Jan-
uary 1955, the classified price schedules were made available. A few days later,
Chairman Strauss revealed the new AEC Power Demonstration Reactor Program,
" 68 STAr. 930, 42 U.S.C.A. §2073(d)(5) (Supp. 1954).
"' See Hearings, supra note 22, pt. x, at i8o.
" §§52, 56, 68 STAT. 929, 931, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2072, 2076 (Supp. 1954).
"'H. R. Rap. No. 2181, op. cit. supra note 49, at 13T.
" §3i, 68 STAT. 927, 42 U.S.C.A. §2o5 (Supp. 1954).
"' 68 STAT. 952, 42 U.S.C.A. §2209 (Supp. 1954).
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providing for private development, construction, and operation of large-scale power
demonstration reactors, with some financial assistance from the AEC.59
The underlying philosophy of this new proposal represented, as noted, a slight
advance over the original 1953 views. Although the Commission was to continue to
push forward with its own experimental and research program, it appeared that
further large prototype construction should be turned over mainly to industry. With-
out further large-scale construction by the Government, the AEC hoped that prin-
cipal financial and technical responsibility would be accepted by industry in order
to achieve economic nuclear power at the earliest possible date. However, the Com-
mission was still convinced that governmental assistance was necessary.
While Congress wrote the new act, the AEC was already working out detailed
plans to bring industry into atomic power to an unprecedented degree. The Com-
mission's thinking was revealed in July 1954 by Dr. Hafstad ° He suggested that
the incentives for industry to invest in large but uneconomical developmental reactors
might be provided under a cooperative arrangement which he called a "reactor-of-
the-year" program. Under this plan, utilities would substitute a few full-scale atomic
reactors for conventional plants in the course of normal expansion. These would
unquestionably cost more than conventional plants. The utilities would offer a sum
more or less equal to the cost of a comparable, conventional plant at the same loca-
tion, and the AEC, as part of its research and development expense, would make up
the difference. If several such proposals could be developed each year, the one of
minimum cost to the Government for the greatest technological advance would be
accepted as the "reactor of the year." In addition, the Government would purchase
by-product plutonium at a fair price.
Although the new act seemed to preclude the use of commission funds to aid
the construction of private nuclear power plants, the Commission remained con-
vinced that some federal aid was necessary. General Manager Nichols explained
to the Joint Committee that, ".... in our talks to various companies ... none of them
felt that the state of the art was yet ready where they could completely finance a
research and development reactor of any reasonable size.""1
Some members of the Joint Committee questioned this conclusion. Senator
Anderson seemed unconvinced that it was wise to make an immediate offer of
subsidy. "Why not try them first?" he suggested. "Then if nobody comes in and
offers to put up his own money, then say, all right.., we will go the subsidy route.
I do not believe you ought to try that first."'62
What sort of assistance did the Commission determine to be appropriate? One
" See AEC Announces Demonstration Program Opening Way for Industrial Power Reactor Develop-
ment, AEC Release No. 589, Jan. io, 1955.
"' See Industrial Atomic Power and Its Relation to Development of Other Natural Resources, an
address by Dr. Lawrence R. Hafstad before the Missouri Basin Inter-Agency Committee, AEC Release,
July 21, 1954.
"s See Hearings, supra note 22, pt. I, at 157.
1 0See id. at 159.
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form of aid it specifically ruled out: the price schedules indicated that it would be
AEC policy not to assist private industry by rigging the secret prices charged and
prices paid by the Government so as to give subsidies of a size known only by those
with access to classified information. In regard to the payments for privately pro-
duced special nuclear material, the Commission put in its price schedule "certain
incentives for weapon grade material" during the first seven year period but
built the pricing structure essentially around the "fuel value" of the materials.0 a
Moreover, the Commission decided to charge for fuel-element fabrication and the
various chemical processing operations so as to recover full costs, thus placing the
full burden of these operations on industry."' Finally, the Commission exercised its
prerogative to charge for special nuclear material consumed or lost. 5  The act
seemed to indicate, it will be recalled, that these last charges might have been waived.
What, then, was the form in which the AEC proposed to make assistance avail-
able to private industry? Under its Power Demonstration Reactor Program, an-
nounced at the same time as the price schedules, the makers of acceptable proposals
for construction of large-scale demonstration power plants might receive one or more
of three kinds of assistance:'"
.. . waiver of the charge that the licensee would otherwise have to pay for the use of
special nuclear material or source material furnished by the AEC; performance in AEC
laboratories and test facilities without charge to licensees of certain mutually agreed upon
research and development work; and financial assistance under appropriate research and
development contracts.
The first group of proposals to the AEC under the Power Demonstration Re-
actor Prograin was received by April i, 1955, the deadline set by the Commission.
(Assuming favorable and effective responses were made, Chairman Strauss had said,
the AEC would establish subsequent dates for receiving additional proposals.) The
initial proposals came from Yankee Atomic Electric in Massachusetts, Common-
wealth Edison of Chicago and associates, Detroit Edison and associates, and the
Consumers Public Power District in Nebraska.67 The four proposals included four
of the five types of reactors stressed by the Commission in its five-year development
program-all except the homogeneous reactor. These projected facilities made up a
total of almost 450,000 kilowatts of generating capacity.
Although its proposal was made under the demonstration program, Common-
wealth Edison and associates, known as the Nuclear Power Group, did not ask for
any of the types of assistance offered by the AEC. One other utility felt that it did
not need such aid from the Commission. New York's Consolidated Edison Com-
pany applied for a straight license, at about this same time, to build a full-scale
"See id. at 75-76.
6' Ibid.
" See id. at 74 and a8o.
a' See Release, supra note 59.
6 See Four Proposals Made to AEC Under Power Demonstration Reactor Program, AEC Release
No. 62o, April 7, 1955.
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nuclear plant at a site on the Hudson River near Peekskill, New York. 8 The
power from this modified version of the Nautilus's pressurized-water reactor was
calculated to serve the rapidly increasing power needs of Westchester County, New
York. Capacity of the plant was projected at nearly 250,000 kilowatts; 14OOOO kilo-
watts were to come from the nuclear portion and the rest from an oil-fired super-
heater arrangement.
By the end of August 1955, two additional proposals had been made. One was a
project of the Pennsylvania Power and Light Company for a large-scale homogeneous
reactor and power plant with a capacity of i50,OOO kilowatts, to be located in eastern
Pennsylvania.69 This meant that all five of the most promising types had been
proposed for large-scale private construction. The other plan came from the Rural
Cooperative Power Association of Elk River, Minnesota, which suggested construc-
tion of a relatively small 22,000 kilowatt plant.7"
Thus, by the early fall of 1955, the induction phase of nuclear power development
appeared to be under way. It is true that in August, the AEC did reject two of
the original demonstration proposals: those of Yankee Atomic Electric and the
Consumers Public Power District. But it approved the other two-those of the
Commonwealth Edison and Detroit Edison groups- as forming a satisfactory basis
for negotiation, and in so doing, paved the way for the first large-scale, privately
owned atomic power reactors.7 '
THE COMMISSION AS REGULATOR
The third function of the Atomic Energy Commission during the present transi-
tional, or "induction," stage of atomic power development is regulation. In carry-
ing on this activity, the Commission's transitional role merges with that of the later
period of full-fledged atomic industry, when research and development are chiefly to
be left to industry, when no promotion will be necessary to induce private firms to
engage in what will have become a competitive source of power, and when the Com-
mission will confine its activity in this field mostly to licensing and continuing
supervision-that is, to regulatory functions similar to those exercised by the several
existing so-called independent regulatory commissions of the federal government.
Those who are induced to enter the present "induction" phase of nuclear power
"' Ibid. See also testimony of Consolidated Edison's president, H.R. Searing, Hearings, supra note
22, pt. 2, at 402-07.
"See N.Y. Times, Aug. I6, 1955, P. 7, Col. 3.
'oSee id., Aug. 9, 1955, P. 8, Col. 2.
'
1 See AEC Authorizes Action Toward New Nuclear Power Reactors, AEC Release No. 674, Aug. 8,
1955. Later, the ABC approved a revised version of the Consumers Public Power proposal as a basis
for negotiations. See ABC Authorizes Reactor Power Plant Negotiations With Nebraska Public Power
Group, ABC Release No. 723, Oct. 27, 1955.
In September 1955, the Commission initiated a second phase of the Power Demonstration Reactor
Program by calling for new proposals from industry-this time, to build nuclear plants of less than
40,oo kilowatts capacity. The types of assistance offered were similar to those offered for the original
proposals, although the Commission stated its willingness to finance and retain title to all or part of a
reactor system as an additional means of aid. See ABC Invites Proposals for Small-Scale Experimental
Nuclear Power Plants, ABC Release No. 695, Sept. 2X, 1955.
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development by the Commission's promotional program (or simply by the hope of
getting a head start which will provide bigger ultimate profits) must operate under
a strict control scheme established by the 1954 act. First, these firms must submit to
the licensing provisions of the act. The primary license requirements are three in
number: one who builds or owns a reactor must have a license; one who acquires,
processes, or uses nuclear fuel-source material or special nuclear material-must have
a license; and one who operates a nuclear reactor must have a license. 2 This system
gives the Commission the opportunity to review in advance all proposed activities
and decide whether and under what conditions they should be carried out. Second,
private participants must submit to a system of subsequent control, which includes
broad inspection and supervision, and the right, under certain circumstances, to
suspend or revoke licenses, to order the operation of licensed facilities, or to recap-
ture special nuclear material.73
The statute provides for two types of facility licenses, under sections 1o3 and
1O4.7' The former are called commercial licenses; the latter, for medical therapy and
research and development, may be called noncommercial. No commercial licenses
may be issued until the AEC has made a finding in writing that some type of
"utilization or production facility has been sufficiently developed to be of practical
value for industrial or commercial purposes. '75 In regard to the licensing of non-
commercial reactors under section io4-the only kind of facilities which will be built
for some years-the Commission's discretion to grant or withhold a license is com-
plete. The section is permissive; it simply authorizes the AEC to issue licenses for
certain kinds of reactors under certain conditions.
The way in which the AEC controls development under section 104 may be
gauged by extrapolation from the criteria used in the demonstration program. The
Commission stated five criteria which would guide its consideration of whether to
accept or reject the various proposals that might be made. Decisions were to be
made on the basis of i) the probable contribution of the proposal toward achieving
competitive nuclear power; 2) the cost to the AEC; 3) the financial risk to be as-
sumed by the maker of the proposal; 4) the competence and responsibility of the
maker; and 5) the assurance given against abandonment of the project.70 It is clear
that the AEC intends to make sure that it has ample discretion in arranging for
industrial participation. Action has already been taken on the original four pro-
posals; the AEC, however, has given no indication (at the time of this writing)
as to which of these criteria resulted in the approval of two proposals and the
original rejection of two others.
These, then, are some of the more important aspects of the regulatory scheme
" §xoi, 68 STAT. 936, 42 U.S.C.A. §2131 (Supp. 1954).
"' See HERBERT S. MARKS AND GEORGE F. TROWBRIDOE, FRAMEWORK FOR ATOMIC INDUSTRY 109-19
(1955)-
"68 STAT. 936, 937, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2133, 2134 (Supp. 1954).
' §io2, 68 STAT. 936, 42 U.S.C.A. §2132 (Supp. 1954).
76 See Release, supra note 59.
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provided by the act. The Commission began to lay the groundwork for its regu-
latory activities soon after the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. It first
issued two interim orders, one of which continued in effect, for the time being, all
the then-existing regulations.77 The Commission then undertook the extensive job
of drawing up a new body of licensing regulations as required by the new legisla-
tion. By early 1955, the staff work had progressed to the point of submitting some
of the draft regulations to the Commission for study. Over the next few months,
these draft regulations in the various fields were published so as to make it possible
for interested parties to inspect them and make any suggestions that seemed desirable
before they became effective.78
For administrative purposes, the Commission, in 1955, established a new Di-
vision of Licensing, to be responsible for the preparation and administration of AEC
regulations dealing with licensing of private atomic energy activities.79 Within a
short time, however, this was superseded by a Division of Civilian Application.
80
Its responsibilities include developing and issuing regulations and price schedules,
licensing, handling requests for access to restricted data, authorizing distribution of
source, special nuclear, by-product, and other materials, and authorizing production
of special nuclear material outside the United States.
For purposes of inspection and supervision of licensed activities, the 1954 act
established a statutory Inspection Division."' The AEC opposed this provision; the
function is important, said the Commission, but it is a tool of management and
should be flexible to allow administrators to adapt it to their particular needs.8"
However, Congress went ahead and inserted the provision in the law. Consequently,
the Commission set up such a division, with the function of gathering information
to show whether contractors, licensees, and officers and employees of the AEC are
complying with the act's provisions and commission rules and regulations.
THE CoMMIssIoN's MULTIPLE ROLE
Three principal functions, then, make up the present multiple role of the AEC.
This role has become increasingly complex as its newer aspects of promotion and
regulation of private activities have come more into prominence. However, these
commission functions are closely bound together during this period and require
the utmost coordination. Both aspects of the present drive to develop civilian nuclear
power-the five-year development program (operating) and the demonstration pro-
7 See Hearings, supra note 22, pt. i, at 56.
8 See id. at 57-58. See also remarks of Charles G. Manly, of the AEC's Division of Civilian Applica-
tion, presented before a Committee of the Machinery and Allied Products Institute, AEC Release, July 27,
1955.
7' See Division of Licensing Established, Harold L. Price Named Its Director, AEC Release No. 615,
March 30, 1955.
8 See AEC Establishes Division of Civilian Application, Harold L. Price Named Director, AEC
Release No. 656, June 29, 1955.
"1 §25(c), 68 STAT. 925, 42 U.S.C.A. §2035(c) (Supp. 1954). See also Hearings, supra note 22,
pt. x, at 221-22.
"' See Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on S. 3323 and H.R. 8862, to Amend
the Atomic Energy Act of x946, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 605-06 (I954).
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gram (promotional and regulatory)-are so closely related that they seem almost to
merge. The tie-up between the two is indicated by two items in the AEC budget
request for fiscal year 1956. In the operating expenses estimates, over and above the
amounts for specific five-year development program items, the Commission asked for
fifty million dollars for what it called the Power Reactor Acceleration Program.
The national interest requires, said the Commission, that the 1954 plans for develop-
ing nuclear power be accelerated. Therefore, it was proposed to spend fifty million
dollars to expand the "engineering development" on nuclear power reactors and to
advance the time when nuclear power will become economically competitive. Of this
sum, costs up to ten million dollars were to be incurred in fiscal year 1956, the rest
to be obligated but unpaid. 3 Later, in the plant and equipment budget, the AEC
asked for an additional twenty-five million dollars for 1956, making a total of
seventy-five million dollars for this acceleration program8 4
Before the Appropriations Committees, commission spokesmen were vague as to
just how this money would be used. It developed that the money would not be
limited to assisting industrial firms which were carrying out projects under the
demonstration reactor program. According to the justifications, the plant and
equipment sum was to be available for commission construction of reactors in which
industry showed no interest, for construction of government facilities to carry out
work required by "both the AEC and private power reactor program," for con-
struction of testing or processing facilities needed because of advances in reactor or
reactor component design, and for joint industry-government projects where the
AEC might build and own a portion of the plant. The operating expenses item
was also to be utilized both in connection with the proposals from industry and in
order to accelerate the Commission's own projects85
The AEC, throughout, asked for a maximum of flexibility on this item. Before
the Joint Committee approved authorization of the twenty-five million dollars in
capital funds, Representative Durham wanted the agency to suggest some formula
specifying that a given percentage of cost would be allocated to industry and the
rest to Government under the joint demonstration program phase. General Man-
ager Fields indicated that this was impossible, that the AEC did not know just
what sort of proposals would later be received, and that the percentage of contribu-
tion by each participant might vary widely. It might be necessary for the Govern-
ment to support some promising types nearly ioo per cent, and others only xo per
cent.88
"What you are essentially asking for," said Representative Holifield, "... is a
" See Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 6766,
Public Works Appropriations, z956, 84 th Cong., ist Sess. 391 (955).8 See Hearings before the Subcommittees of the House Committee on Appropriations on the Supple-
mental Appropriation Bill, z956, 84 th Cong., ist Sess. 985 (1955).
"DId. at 985-86.
8 See Hearings before the Subcommittee of the loint Committee on Atomic Energy on Authorizing
Legislation, 84 th Cong., ist Sess. 13-14 (955).
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floating fund of twenty-five million dollars which, as the different reactor programs
are developed, you may assign on the judgment of the Commission ... as you feel
will be necessary for each one of these reactor programs."87  Commissioner Libby
agreed that this was true8
It was not unrealistic to assume that some of the more promising types of re-
actors might not be proposed by industry. The initial offers made by industry under
the Power Demonstration Reactor Program did not include the homogeneous type,
considered by the AEC to be perhaps the most promising of all in the long run.
The Commission anticipated such a development and discussed it with the Joint
Committee prior to receipt of the April I proposals. Representative Holifield
strongly urged that the Government cannot just let this program lag. "If we do
not get the proper kind of responses to the different types of reactors that seem
feasible," he went on, ". . . the Government should go ahead with experimental
work.. . . We cannot afford to be outdistanced in this field by foreign powers."s9
Although Mr. Holifield was most insistent, the AEC and the Joint Committee
seemed generally to share his feeling. Later, when the first proposals were all in,
Commissioner Libby stated his surprise and disappointment that no one planned to
build a large homogeneous reactor, and suggested that he would strongly favor
governmental development and construction if no one took the initiative on this
reactor type at the next submission of proposals." This did not become necessary in
the case of this particular type because of the later proposal by the Pennsylvania
Power and Light Company. But it was by no means assured that the five reactor
types stressed under both the five-year program and the demonstration program
would ultimately prove to be the most fruitful designs. The AEC at this time (mid-
1955) was working ahead on several additional reactor types which might, it seemed,
turn out to be even more promising than the original five. In this case, the AEC
will, doubtless, again stand ready to assume the initiative in large-scale construction
if industry should fail to do so.
The over-all goal of maximum progress toward economic nuclear power, then,
binds together the present governmental and private programs. It conditions the
AEC's own efforts and the nature of the promotion to be carried on. The Com-
mission must stimulate industrial participation not only for its own sake, but as a
means of achieving competitive power most swiftly, as required by the need to keep
in the forefront of world atomic energy development. In this joint operation, coordi-
nation and harmonization are necessary. This must be the task of the AEC.
TRANSITION TO THE REGULATORY PHASE
The present three-part role of the AEC in civilian atomic power is a transitory
one. Later, the Commission's operating and promotional roles in the field will
17 Id. at 13.
88 Ibid.
', See Hearings, supra note 22, Pt. 2, at 423.
00 See Hearings, supra note 86, at 55.
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presumably diminish as the atomic industry gets under way in earnest. Since the
atom offers a potentially cheap source of power, there should be no need for
permanent subsidization to maintain a high level of progress in constructing and
perfecting nuclear plants. The Commission should be able to allow industry to
handle most of the development work; thus, the principal duties that will fall to
the AEC will be those of a regulatory nature.
This future period of full-scale atomic industry will involve section io3 licenses
for construction and ownership by private firms of atomic power reactors. At first
reading, the law seems to draw such a distinction between these and section 104
developmental licenses that the future period of regulation appears likely to be
characterized by a lesser degree of control by the AEC and more freedom for
private activity. However, when the language of the act is closely examined, one
sees that it allows the Commission substantially as much discretion to grant or refuse
licenses, and to control those granted, as under section io4y1
There has been some criticism of the 1954 act because of the strictness of the
regulatory scheme set forth therein. It is an unusual field, and the requirements of
security and safety are unusually great. Furthermore, there is, as yet, little experi-
ence with which to give meaning to some of the terminology and concepts used
by Congress in setting forth and defining the procedures and policies to be followed
by the AEC. If it seems that the agency's discretion is extremely broad, it is per-
haps the result of the fact that experience in atomic power is so meager that it
is now impossible to legislate in meaningful terms. Perhaps the several years of ex-
perience under section 104 which will precede the granting of any section io3 com-
mercial licenses will be such as to give meaning to the standards and policies Con-
gress incorporated in the act. If not, it may be that the law will have to be amended
to clarify and specify in certain areas in order to leave the agency somewhat less
free to take whatever course it feels is appropriate.
Whatever modifications may be made in the statutory framework supporting
the regulatory functions of the Commission, the problem will remain of combining
in one agency a substantial load of regulatory duties and an equally substantial op-
erating program in the fields of production, weapons, research, and reactors for
military propulsion. It is essentially the same organizational problem as that posed
by the threefold combination of the present developmental period. The arguments
for retaining all functions in one agency may be less compelling in this later stage;
the traditional issue of the wisdom of combining regulation with the executive and
operating activities will be more pertinent.
Most political scientists argue against such a combination, particularly in agencies
headed by a group of commissioners. "The common experience is," said the first
Hoover Commission's task force, "that groups are better fitted for judgment and
"' See MARKS AND TROWBRIUDG, Op. cit. supra note 73, at 82-85.
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decision than for the execution of large-scale operations."" Furthermore, the task
force continued, most regulatory commissions find that their purely regulatory duties
are extremely time-consuming; not only are they not fitted for operating functions,
but performance of these weakens their ability to perform their primary functions
by taking time that should be devoted to regulatory duties. The task force sug-
gested that operating functions should be placed in the regular departments as far
as possible, so that they may be carried out under direct executive supervision and
responsibility.
The problem, however, is not an immediate one, for it will arise only when the
nuclear power industry becomes a reality. How long is the present transitional or
"induction" stage likely to last? Although atomic energy has been one of the areas
most productive of wrong predictions and inaccurate guesses about the future,
even from the best informed, a few points are clear. One is that the first round of
large-scale demonstration power plants will just be starting to operate by i96o,
assuming that some of them can get under way soon. One cannot help thinking
that the 1959 completion date set by Detroit Edison is over-optimistic. Even the
PWR will not be completed until 1957. In any case, experience with these first
plants, and perhaps with subsequent ones which may be begun in the next year or
two, cannot be expected to be available before the early I96O's. One hesitates to pre-
dict the end of the induction stage before 1965. The AEC's Reactor Development
Division head, W. Kenneth Davis, has said that the induction phase will probably
end at about that date, although it may vary two or three years either way.f3 The
end will be largely a psychological point, he has suggested, when confidence in the
eventual advantages of nuclear power becomes so great that atomic plants form
a large proportion of all new power plants. At this date, the problems will prob-
ably still not be solved, and no one will have generated nuclear power that actually
is competitive.
It is easy to see that the AEC is not about to be overwhelmed with regulatory
duties emanating directly from the generation of nuclear power. For at least a
decade, the number of atomic power plants will probably be small. During that
time, the AEC may be expected to continue in its operating-promotional-regulatory
role, which forms the bridge to the atomic power industry of the future.
"' COMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, TAsK FORCE IEPORT ON REGULATORY
CoMiMIssIONs, APPENDIX N 30 (1949).
"' See Nuclear Power Industry Development, an address by W. Kenneth Davis before the American
Power Conference, AEC Release, April 1, 1955, P. 7-
